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TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY?. THE CURIOUS PATH OF
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE REFORM IN THE U.K.
CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS* AND JOHN M. CONLEY**
INTRODUCTION
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times...
It was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair...
-Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (1859)
This quote well characterizes the views of those in London who,
in 2005, supported the expanded disclosure of the social and environ-
mental risks posed by companies' business strategies and operational
decisions. On March 21, 2005, in a supposed spring of hope, Parliament
passed a statute requiring that 1,290 British-based companies listed on
the London Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ
publish an annual Operating and Financial Review and Directors Report
("OFR").I The OFR statute, the culmination of a decade-long examination
of corporate governance, required companies to identify, consider, and
disclose a wide range of risks, including material social and environmen-
tal risks, as part of providing a comprehensive, forward-looking account
of business strategy. 2 The process of developing the statute was highly-
publicized; as one British op-ed writer noted, "[tihe Operating and Finan-
cial Review has rarely been out of the headlines since the concept was first
mooted in the late 1990s."3 Some version of the OFR has been suggested
as best practice for large companies for many years, but this was the first
Professor of Law and Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law.
** William Rand Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1 The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors' Report etc.)
Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 (U.K).2 Seegenerally Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Ero-
sion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'LL. J. 493 (2005).
3 David Phillips & Peter Wyman, Do Not Confuse Good Practice with Red Tape, FIN.
TIMES.COM, Nov. 30,2005, http'//us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?newsid=fto 113020051
345288982 (Peter Wyman is head of regulatory policy for Price Waterhouse-Cooper).
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statutory requirement.4 But on November 28, 2005, in the "winter of our
discontent," Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown abruptly revers-
ed course and rescinded the OFR, announcing its demise in a speech to
the Confederation of British Industry ("CBI"). 5
Brown had been advised that "[i] fwe wanted [a] deregulatory win
with appeal to big business, a radical symbolic stripping-down of the OFR
would go down incredibly well."6 In fact, "the government's efforts 'back-
fired spectacularly,' eliciting a firestorm of criticism 'from an unlikely alli-
ance of business leaders, City investors, trade unions and green activists,"7
and litigation threats from Friends of the Earth.' As documents produced
in advance of that litigation made clear, not only were external parties sur-
prised and appalled by the decision, but the ministers of the Department
of Trade and Industry ("DTI"), the departmental author of the legislation,
and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ("DEFRA")
had only been informed of the decision five days before it was announced.9
One may suspect that the OFR "u-turn"1° also did not "go down incred-
ibly well"" with Ministers of those Departments, Alan Johnson (DTI)
and Margaret Beckett (DEFRA), when seven years of work was scuttled
with five days' notice.' 2
The authors admit to some amount of dismay as well. On No-
vember 28, 2005, after publishing and distributing a fifty-eight page law
review article that analyzed the OFR in detail just two weeks earlier, we
were faced with having written what seemed to be a leading contender
'See Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 493-530.
5Jill Treanor & Mark Milner, Brown Plan to Cut Red Tape for Business Provokes Chorus
of Disapproval, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 29, 2005, at 1.
6 HM Treasury (U.K), Meeting Notes Released to FoE as Part of Pre-Action Response (2005),
httpJ/hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/02F/9B/EASC-stakeholder-meeting-notes2.pdf [hereinafter
HM Treasury Meeting Notes]. As a part of pre-action protocol, Friends of the Earth requested
information about the basis for the Chancellor's decision to rescind the OFR statute. Treasury
Solicitors made these meeting notes and other materials public. See id.
'John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory versus
Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (2005)
(quoting Treanor & Milner, supra note 5).
8 Id. at4.
9Press Release, Friends of the Earth, Brown Kept DTI in Dark Over Corporate Reporting
U-Turn (Mar. 8,2006), http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press-releases/brownkepLdtiin
_dark ove 07032006.html [hereinafter FoE Press Release].
T1 Id.
"Contra HM Treasury Meeting Notes, supra note 6.
12 FoE Press Release, supra note 9.
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for the "longest law review article with the shortest half-life" in history.13
Two days after Chancellor Brown made his announcement, Professor
Jayne Barnard invited one of us to discuss "the origins of [the OFRI
proposals, the political dynamics that fostered them, and the political
dynamics that ultimately did them in" as part of the William & Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review Symposium on "Corporate Gover-
nance and Environmental Best Practices." 4 We accepted with a somewhat
heavy heart. For the authors, the Symposium provided a chance to at least
think about the apparent denouement of the OFR drama. More impor-
tantly, it seemed to be an opportunity to reconsider our thesis on the impli-
cations of the OFR developments for our corporate governance theory: that
the U.K was developing a "third way" between the shareholder and
stakeholder conceptions of the firm, fueled in significant part by rapidly
shifting norms among a substantial number of institutional investors.'5
This Article is the result, although the denouement may have been
only apparent, and the drama may have been simply between acts. As
it turns out, the Treasury decision was hastily considered and premised
on the belief that, after "odd moan[s]" about the expenses of having al-
ready begun to prepare annual OFRs, business would welcome the OFR
pull-back and investors would generally line up behind business. 6 It was
also thought that opposition would primarily come from environmental
groups, the corporate social responsibility ("CSR") lobby, and trade unions.'
But Treasury did not get the business reaction quite right and it badly
misread investor sentiment." In fact, some of the most resounding howls
of outrage came from investors, as they collectively acted to express their
views about what a revived, albeit stripped-down, OFR would need to in-
clude.' 9 Moreover, Treasury essentially ignored the accounting profession
in rescinding the OFR regulations, even though the original impetus for
See generally Williams & Conley, supra note 2.
'4 E-mail from Jayne W. Barnard, Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law, to
Cynthia A. Williams, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, and John
M. Conley, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of-Law (Nov. 30, 2005)
(on file with authors). See Symposium, Corporate Governance and Environmental Best
Practices, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 1 (2006).
15 See generally Williams & Conley, supra note 2.
'
6 Note to Chancellor of HM Treasury (U.K) on Operating and Financial Review (OFR): De-
regulatory Opportunity 5 (October 11, 2005), http'hvww.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/BB6/1F/easc
advicel0nov020306.pdf [hereinafter Note to Chancellor on OFR Deregulatory Opportunity].17 Id. at 5.
18 See infra Parts II-III.
'9 See infra Part III.
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OFRs had come from that quarter.2' The Treasury was correct on one
count, though; environmentalists and CSR activists, with which London
is awash, quickly added their voices to the din of anger and dismay ex-
pressed daily in the press.2' Within months, conflicting policy proposals
proliferated from Treasury, DTI, DEFRA and Parliament, all trying to
fill the regulatory vacuum left by withdrawal of the OFR proposals.22
One public relations executive pithily summarized developments, com-
menting that "[t here is a groundswell of opinion telling the Chancellor
he has been an idiot."23 In the middle of this "clumsy policy muddle,"24
Financial Times writer Barney Jopson stated that "it was difficult to
know whether to laugh or cry.., as the government's handling of corpo-
rate reporting descended further into farce-or was it tragedy?"25
As this article is being written, this story appears to have entered
its final chapter. Barring any other unexpected developments, the nearly
twenty-year-old company law reform process, of which the OFR proposal
was a part, has apparently entered its final stage, with Parliament recently
enacting legislation that fundamentally changes the U.K's company law.26
Due in part to the energy unleashed amongst investors, CSR activists, and
the accounting community in response to the OFR "u-turn,"27 the new
Companies Bill emphasizes the consideration of social and environmental
issues within the scope of directors' duties and incorporates social and
20 See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 175-78.
22See infra Part IV.
23CIPRAdds Weight to OFR Rescue Lobby, PRWEEK, Mar. 17,2006, at 10 (quoting Francis
Ingham, Head of Public Affairs, Chartered Institute for Public Relations ("CIPR")). The
quote refers to Chancellor Brown as having been an "idiot" in this decision, not generally.
Id. In fact, Chancellor Brown is very well-regarded, and it is thought uncharacteristic of
him to have made such a hasty decision without carefully thinking through the conse-
quences. See generally Andrew Roth, Gordon Brown Profiled, GUARDIAN, Mar. 6,2001, http'/
www.guardian.co.uk/budget200l/story/O,,447338,00.html. Yet, this instance may exemplify
a deeply-rooted understanding that, to gain the support of business, one should deregulate
higgledy-piggledy, even if it means axing intelligent policies that might promote thoughtful
management, market efficiency, and long-term investment. Regrettably, this understanding
is probably shared among many leaders with nationwide political aspirations.
24 Barney Jopson, Directors Need Safe Harbour on Forward-Looking Statements, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 9, 2006, at 10.25 /d.
26 See The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2006/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. This Article was written before the passage of the
Companies Act on Nov. 8, 2006. However, the relevant portions of the final, royal assent
version of the bill do not differ substantially from the Companies Bill referred to herein.
27 FoE Press Release, supra note 9.
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environmental reporting into a "business review" that must conform with
the European Union's Accounts Modernization Directive.2" Interestingly,
this legislation may accomplish the same substantive ends as the OFR
requirements in a more effective way.29
Ultimately, for all of the government's fumbling, the entire im-
broglio may prove to be a cautious advance for corporate accountability.
Parliament's actions on the Companies Bill may strengthen the substan-
tive standards of conduct required of public company directors and make
that conduct subject to enhanced disclosure.3" If so, part of the credit will
go the surprising coalition of environmentalists, CSR activists, NGOs,
institutional investors, and accountants, all of which reacted strongly to
Chancellor Brown's about-face.31 Collectively, their actions leave an im-
pression that London has seen a significant change in the norms concern-
ing the accountability expected of public companies.
To explain the context of the OFR and the debate over it, Part I
contrasts the regulation of risk disclosure in the United States to what
the U.K.'s original OFR regulations and the EU's Accounts Moderniza-
tion Directive reflect. Part II provides some further detail on the U.K.
Treasury's process of deciding to scrap the OFR, focusing particularly on
its political analysis. Part III discusses the reactions of various institu-
tional actors to the decision, including companies, accountants, investors,
and CSR activists. Part III also traces the subsequent developments that
those reactions provoked. Part IV describes the Companies Bill's new
regulation of directors' duties and disclosure and explores some of the
debate concerning its provisions. Part V discusses the implications of
these developments for corporate governance theory. Throughout the
Article, the authors expand on the previously advanced theory that the
corporate governance system in the U.K. is quite distinct from that in
the U.S., although both are typically treated as part of a unitary "Anglo-
American corporate model."32
18 See TRUCOST, PLC, TRUCOST GuIDE-EUACcOuNTs MODERNISATION DIRECTIVE (2005),
available at http'//www.businessandbiodiversity.orgpdf/EU%20Accounts%20and%20Mod
ernization %20Directive.pdf.29 See infra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.30 See infra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
31 See infra Part III.
32 See Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 530-50.
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I. REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE OF RISK
A. General Approaches: U.S. and U.K.
The recent business scandals in the United States have led corpo-
rate boards, institutional investors, and government officials throughout
the world to pay increased attention to issues of corporate governance.
Consequently, two issues have gained prominence: (1) the structure of
companies' internal financial controls, and (2) companies' openness to ad-
dressing a wide range of market, business, strategic and operational risk
in their enterprise risk management ("ERM") strategies. In response to
the fraud and financial malfeasance of companies such as Enron and
WorldCom,33 the United States Congress and Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") worked to enhance internal financial controls and
address the fraudulent accounting that misled investors about short-
term financial risks. The product was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,34 which
imposes more stringent government oversight of accountants and height-
ened requirements for corporate officials.35 Although the requirements of
Sarbanes-Oxley make sense in light of the Enron debacle, the strategic
discussion, disclosure, and management of risk in the United States re-
mains relatively undeveloped, leaving investors exposed to unexplored
areas of risk. The Conference Board recently issued a report indicating
that only twenty-five percent of directors of non-financial companies
consider all major risks, including strategic and business risks, as part
of their discussions of risk, and that about two-thirds of the boards of
Fortune 500 companies place responsibility for risk analysis entirely in
the audit committee.36
In contrast, discussions of internal controls and enterprise risk
management were initiated in the U.K. well before the Enron fallout.
Since 1998, the Combined Code has provided that listed companies should
33 See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet (Aug. 26,2002), http://www.forbes
.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html (describing the facts of several corporate scandals).
3' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2007)).35 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262 (2007) (establishing a bevy of regulations to enhance public
company accounting and corporate responsibility, such as making corporate officials certify
the state of their internal financial controls and financial reports).
36 See Press Release, The Conference Board, Corporate Directors May Not Be Providing




discuss in their Annual Report their systems of internal controls, includ-
ing "financial, operational and compliance controls and risk management
systems."37 Also, the Turnbull Committee Guidance on Internal Control
("Turnbull Report"), published by the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in England and Wales in 1999, gave public companies advice on estab-
lishing, evaluating, and publicly reporting on their systems of internal
control and risk management.3 The Turnbull Report acknowledged that
an effective internal control system might address a wide range of risks,
including "legal, health, safety and environmental, reputation, and busi-
ness probity issues" in addition to financial risk.39 As a result, a cottage
industry grew up advising British companies on establishing effective
internal controls.4" Once the market began to appreciate the importance
of risk management and internal control, institutional investors began
paying more attention to disclosure about these issues, both to manage
investment risk in their own investment portfolios and to evaluate the
thinking of boards of listed companies concerning a broad range of po-
tential risks to company strategy, operations or reputation.41 This is the
fertile soil in which the OFR consultation process flourished, trying to
instill a longer-term perspective among directors and investors by en-
couraging directors to identify and discuss social and environmental risks
as part of their risk management.42
An example of the interaction of risk management and disclosure
may clarify what is at issue in the U.S. versus U.K. and EU approaches
to social and environmental risk. Consider risks and opportunities from
climate change that, whether from physical changes in the environment,
regulatory efforts to mitigate those changes, or technological innovations to
address greenhouse gas emissions, are evident across the whole spectrum
37 See FIN. SERVICES AUTH., COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 1.C.2.1 (2003).
The Combined Code contains principles of corporate governance that are incorporated
into the London Stock Exchange's listing rules, with which listed companies are expected
to "comply or explain" their non-compliance. Id. pmbl.
3 8 See INST. OF CHARTERED ACCT. IN ENG. AND WALES, INTERNAL CONTROL: GUIDANCE FOR
DIRECTORS ON THE COMBINED CODE 30 (1999). This report is commonly referred to as the
"Turnbull Report."
39 Id. app.
40 See Institute of Chartered Accountants, Internal Control: The Turnbull Report and
Implementing Turnbull, http://www.icaew.comindex.cfm?aub=tb2I16242 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2007).
41 See generally Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 514-16.
42 See id.
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of economic activity.43 These developments affect myriad industries, in-
cluding agriculture, energy, transportation, water and waste treatment,
oil and gas, forestry, pulp and paper, basic industries (e.g., steel, chem-
icals, mining), tourism, building construction, real estate, manufacturing,
and insurance." These risks and opportunities have intensified since
February 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol took effect. 45 The parties to the
Protocol, including the European Union, Russia, and Japan, have begun
to implement mechanisms for limiting greenhouse gas emissions, such as
emissions caps and trading systems for excess greenhouse gas capacity.46
Even though the United States did not ratify the treaty, American
companies face increased financial risks as a result of its coming into
force. For instance, European companies from countries participating in
the trading system will be able to reap economic benefits from reducing
their greenhouse gas emissions by selling credits for their unused emis-
sions.4 ' This seems likely to bring down their costs of production, enhance
their competitive economic position, and put U.S. companies at a compar-
ative disadvantage. A related issue is that of insurance costs. Swiss Re,
the world's second largest re-insurer, has identified climate risk as "an
emerging liability risk."' Accordingly, it is including an analysis of a com-
pany's approach to climate risk in its underwriting of liability insurance
for directors and officers.49 As European companies become motivated
by the financial incentives of the Kyoto Protocol and increasingly attend
to climate risk, their insurance premiums will presumably become less
4 See INNOVEST STRATEGIC VALUE ADVISORS, INC., CERES SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE
PROJECT, VALUE AT RISK: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNANCE 10, 34-44
(2002), available at http://www.ceres.orgtpub/docs/Ceres-value-at risk_0418.pdf.
44Id.
41 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997,37 I.L.M. 22, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997L.7/Add. 1, available at http://unfccc
.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
4' For an overview of the three "flexibility mechanisms" for meeting emission-reduction
targets provided for in the Kyoto Protocol, see Secretariat of the U.N. Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, Kyoto Mechanisms-Background, httpJ/unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/
mechanisms/items/2998.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
" See Secretariat of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Emissions
Trading, http'//unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/emissions trading/items/2731.php
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007). These benefits go above and beyond the benefits of the reduc-
tions themselves, which are often obtained by reducing energy use. See id.
J J. Kevin Healy & Jeffery M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy Issue-It's
a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 89, 102 (2004).
49 Id. at 102.
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expensive than those of American companies.5" Despite the evidence of the
growing financial materiality of the climate change risk, it is still extremely
difficult to determine the extent specific industries and individual companies
are exposed to that risk by reading their public disclosure documents.5 '
We know from analogous studies of the impact of new environmental
regulations that companies within an industry are dissimilarly affected by
new regulations, depending on where they produce their products, how re-
cently they have upgraded production facilities, what investments they have
made in mitigating risks, and so on." This information-the financial risk
posed to sectors and companies by climate change-is unavailable in high-
quality form to investors reading American securities filings because of
inadequacies in disclosure regulations and how they are interpreted. 3 The
50 See id. at 101-13 (identifying insurance costs, as well as other financial risks to American
corporations from climate risk).51 See MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH-U.S., THIRD SURVEY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL & GAS,
PETROCHEMICAL, AND UTILITIES COMPANIES 23-29,38-40 (2004), available at http://www
.foe.orgfcamps/intl/corpacct/wallstreet/secsurvey2004.pdf. This survey evaluated climate
change disclosure and found continued non-disclosure by some companies in almost every
industry with meaningful information about the financial risks of climate change. Id. at
23-29. Even in companies where the record is better, such as electrical utilities, where
24 of 26 companies made some disclosure of climate risk, the quality and utility varies
widely. Id. at 23-29, 38-40. See also DUNCAN AUSTIN ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INST. &
SAM GROUP, CHANGING DRIVERS: THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON COMPETITIVENESS
AND VALUE CREATION IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 43-55 (2003), available at http://pdf
.wri.org/changing-drivers fullreport.pdf(analyzing the competitive challenges and po-
tential financial impact of climate change regulations on individual manufacturers within
the global automotive industry and projecting significant, financially material effects that
differ between companies); AMANDA SAUER ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INST. & SAM GROUP,
TRANSPARENCY ISSUES WITH THE ACEA AGREEMENT 3-11 (2005), available at http://pdf
.wri.org/acea driving-blindly.pdf(describing the agreement between the European auto-
mobile manufacturers' association ("ACEA") and the European Commission, under which
the automobile manufacturers agreed to either reduce the carbon intensity of their prod-
ucts by 2008 or face mandatory EU regulation (known as the "ACEA Agreement"), and
the lack of information about the financial impact of the ACEA Agreement on individual
car manufacturers).52 See DUNCAN AUSTIN & AMANDA SAUER, WORLD RESOURCES INST., CHANGING OIL: EMERG-
ING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 25
(2002) (reporting similar findings for the oil and gas industry); ROBERT REPETO &
DUNCAN AUSTIN, WORLD RESOURCES INST., COMING CLEAN: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF
FINANCIALLY SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 27 (2000) (describing differential
financial impacts on companies within the paper and pulp mill industries from new
environmental regulations, and noting that these differential financial impacts are
impossible to ascertain from the companies' securities filings).
" Although we have argued previously that Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Management
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLy REV. [Vol. 31:317
same lack of information is found across a wide range of serious social
and environmental risks, all of which may have material, long-term
financial consequences. Some examples include: labor abuses in clothing,
shoes, and light industry generally;54 the effects of oil and gas operations
on indigenous peoples' property, culture, and general rights;55 HIV/AIDS
infection among workers and related individuals; 6 and human rights poli-
cies and security arrangements, especially within extractive industries. 7
In each of these examples, there exists no requirement that investors
routinely be provided with material risk-related information about Ameri-
can companies. In contrast, new disclosure requirements in both the EU
and the U.K. should start to bring more of this information to the mar-
kets, particularly as institutional investors increasingly demand it. The
following sections discuss those disclosure requirements in more detail.5"
B. The European Union
Even before legal developments occurred at the EU level, several
individual member states had taken steps in the direction of mandated
social and environmental reporting. "For example, France,59 Belgium,6 °
Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A"), if broadly interpreted, does require the disclosure
of much of this information, many public companies interpret it narrowly. See Williams
& Conley, supra note 2, at 524-26.
" See Clean Clothes Campaign, The Principles of the Clean Clothes Campaign, http:l!
www.cleanclothes.org/campaign/principles.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
5 See World Rainforest Movement, Bolivia: Indigenous Peoples Concerned by Oil
Prospection, http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/39/Bolivia.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).56 See, e.g., GLOBAL POLICY NETWORK, HIGHLIGHTS OF CURRENT LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS
IN LESOTHO 2 (2006), available at http://www.gpn.org/data/lesotho/lesotho-analysis.pdf
(noting that thirty-five percent of the population of Lesotho is HIV positive).
7 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Conflict Diamonds, http://www.amnestyusa.org/Our
_Issues/ConflictDiamonds/page.do?id=1011014&nl=3&n2=74 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
E8 The material in the next two subsections draws from our prior work. Its inclusion here,
however, is necessary to describe the background of developments with the OFR regu-
lations. See generally Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 503-23.
9 See Law No. 2001-152 of February 19, 2001, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Feb. 20, 2001, p. 2774 (Fr.) (amending C. TRAV. arts.
443-44). This section sets out the "social, environmental and ethical considerations fund
management for employee savings should take into account when buying or selling stocks."
Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 503 n.44.
60 Law of April 28, art. 42(3) Moniteur Belge (2d. ed.) May 15, 2003, p. 26,407 (Belg.)
(requiring pension organizations' investment strategies to account for social, ethical and
environmental aspects).
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Germany,61 and the U.K.62 passed laws that require pension funds to dis-
close the extent to which they take ethical, social, and environmental in-
formation into account in constructing their investment portfolios."63 As
hoped, these laws are starting to have important effects on the investment
behavior of large public-sector pension funds.64 The thinking is that, as
pension fund managers start to ask companies for information on these
issues, the companies will respond by making the information more gen-
erally available.65 "Acting more directly, Denmark,66 the Netherlands,67
Norway,6" and Sweden69 have all required companies to provide expanded
environmental information in their annual reports, starting with Denmark
in 1999. "70 France has implemented requirements for comprehensive dis-
closure of both social and environmental information.71
61 See Gesetz zur Reform gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und zur Forderung eines kap-
italgedeckten Altersvorsorgevermgens (Altersvermbgensgesetz-AVmG), v. 29.6.2001 (BGB1.
I S. 1310, 1323) (F.R.G.) (requiring that pension funds state whether and, if so, how, in-
vestment decisions are affected by social and environmental factors); SUSAN A. AARONSON
& JAMES T. REEVES, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: THE ROLE OF
PUBLIC POLICY 21 (2003).
62 Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy
etc.) Amendment Regulations, SI 1999/1849, § 2(4) (U.K.) (amending SI 1996/3127). This
regulation "requires trustees of occupational pension funds to disclose 'the extent to which
social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken into account' when making in-
vestment decisions." Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 504 n.47 (quoting Occupational
Schemes Amendment Regulation § 2(4)).
6 Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 503-04.
Id. at 533-35 (describing the impact of the U.K pension fund disclosure regulations on the
growth of the socially-responsible investment market and on engagement by investment pro-
fessionals in discussions with portfolio companies concerning social and environmental issues).
65 See id. "Since these requirements are relatively new, none dating back before 1999, any
assessment is necessarily tentative." Id. at 504 n.49.
66 See generally The Social Index, http://www.detsocialeindeks.dk/extweb/dsi/dsi.nsf/DocNo/
eng-00-02-01 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). The Danish Ministry of Social Affairs has devel-
oped a mechanism called the "social index" to measure companies' social responsibility. Id.67 Uitvoeringsregeling milieuverslaglegging, Dec. 14, 1998, Staatscourant 1998, 248 pag.
11 (Dec. 24, 1998) This regulation "requires companies to report on any environmental
effects of their activities". Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 504 n.51.6 8 See AARONSON & REEVES, supra note 61, app. 4.
6 Lag om allmnna pensionsfonder, National Pension Funds Act, SFS 2000:192, available
at http://www.riksdagen.se/debalt/sfstlindex.asp. This Act "requires companies to draw
up an annual business plan that describes how investment decisions take environmental
and ethical considerations into account." Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 504 n.53.70 Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 504. See AARONSON & REEVES, supra note 61, app. 4.
71 See Decree No. 2002-221 of February 20, 2002, Journal Officiel de la Rpublique Fran-
aise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Feb. 21, 2002, p. 3360 (Fr.) (concerning the
application of[C. COM.] art. 155-102-1 and modifying Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967,
J.O., Mar. 24, 1967, p.2843); Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 504 & n.55.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 31:317
Since 1968, the EU has been in the process of trying to harmonize
the company laws7 2 and accounting standards to accord with the Treaty
of Rome, which created the European economic community. In the last
five years the harmonization process has included "extensive discussion
of the social and environmental responsibilities of companies, culminat-
ing in the enactment of new social and environmental disclosure obli-
gations."74 In its May 15, 2001 Communication on the EU Strategy for
Sustainable Development, the European Commission "invited" compa-
nies with 500 employees or more to publish annually a "triple bottom
line" report evaluating their performance against economic, environmen-
tal and social criteria.7" The Commission also adopted Recommendation
2001/453/EC,76 which calls for requirements that companies:
72 In American parlance, the company laws would be known as the "corporate laws."
" Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 505. See European Union, Company Law: Intro-
duction, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/legen/lvb/126002.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter EU Company Law Introduction]. "Harmonization typically proceeds by
means of Directives proposed by the European Commission (the EU executive) and
passed by the Council of the European Union (a legislative body composed of member state
ministers)" with varying degrees of consultative or co-decision-making power vested in
the European Parliament, which is directly elected by the EU citizenry. Williams & Conley,
supra note 2, at 505 n.61. See also EU Company Law Introduction, supra. Member states
are required to implement Directives through national legislation. See Europa, Decision-
making in the European Union, http://europa.eu/institutions/decision-making/indexen
.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
71 Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 506. See, e.g., Communication from the European
Commission Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to
Sustainable Development, COM (2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002); Promoting a European
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 3, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18,
2001). The European Commission's
aimfl [was] to launch a wide debate on how the European Union could
promote corporate social responsibility at both the European and in-
ternational level, in particular on how to make the most of existing
experiences, to encourage the development of innovative practices, to
bring greater transparency and to increase the reliability of evaluation
and validation.
Id.
7 Commission's Proposal to the Gothenburg European Council: A Sustainable Europe for
a Better World:A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development, at 8, COM (2001)
264 final (May 15, 2001).
7 Commission Recommendation of 30 May 2001 on the Recognition, Measurement, and
Disclosure of Environmental Issues in the Annual Accounts and Annual Reports of
Companies, 2001 O.J. (L 156) 33 (June 13, 2001).
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* disclose and incorporate into their financial accounts
thirty-nine highly specific categories of environmen-
tal information;77 and
0 include in their annual reports to shareholders in-
formation on environmental issues facing the com-
pany,7" on its policies and programs for improving
environmental protection, and on its environmen-
tal performance in such areas as energy use, water
use, emissions, and waste disposal.79
In 2003, much of this Recommendation was given the force of law
with passage of the Modernization Directive, which requires EU com-
panies to include "a fair review of the development and performance of
the company's business and of its position, together with a description
of the principal risks and uncertainties that it faces" in their annual
reports.8 " The Modernization Directive requires that:
To the extent necessary for an understanding of the com-
pany's development, performance or position, the analysis
shall include both financial and, where appropriate,
non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the
particular business, including information relating to en-
vironmental and employee matters.8 1
The EU's legislative bodies explained that the requirement to
provide non-financial information should "lead to an analysis of environ-
mental and social aspects necessary for an understanding of the com-
pany's development, performance or position." 2 While states were free to
"exempt small and medium enterprises from the nonfinancial disclosure
7 7The recommendations for environmental accounting include: (1) principles for the recog-
nition of environmental expenditures and liabilities and of site dismantling and restoration
costs, (2) principles for adjusting the values of impaired assets, and (3) provisions for site
restoration or dismantling and for discounting future costs to present value. Id. at 37-38.78 Id. at 40.
79 Id. at 40-41. As the Recommendation states, the purpose of this disclosure is to permit
"users of the annual report to be able to ascertain to what extent environmental pro-
tection is an integral part of the company's policies and activities." Id. at 40.
80 Council Directive 2003/51/EC, art. 1, § 14(a)(1)(a), 2003 O.J. (L 178) 16, 18 (EU). This
is commonly referred to as the "Modernization Directive."
81 Id.
8 21 Id. pmbl. § 9, at 17.
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obligations," 3 the expectation was that large European companies would
disclose "much more social and environmental information annually,
and, more specifically, to account formally for environmental costs and
potential liabilities."8 4
C. The United Kingdom
In 1998, the U.K. launched a comprehensive review of its company
law, which in early 2006 led to the introduction of legislation discussed
below. 5 One of the first steps in that review was a discussion of the cor-
porate purpose, or what we in the U.S. call the shareholder/stakeholder
debate. In its Final Report, the Company Law Review ("CLR") Steering
Group recognized that the "primary purpose of the corporation is to create
profits for shareholders. ... "86 The CLR Steering Group went well
beyond the narrow American concept of shareholder value, however.
First, it "concluded that the time frame for assessing profit creation must
be long-term, not short-term."8 1 Second, it found that "long-term share-
holder value is best achieved by reducing a company's future social and
environmental risk," and by enhancing its reputation through consider-
ation of "'the rights and needs of players other than shareholders.'8 8
"Having settled on this 'enlightened-shareholder' view, the CLR
Steering Group then proposed a number of mechanisms to reinforce its
conclusion that companies need to be managed for the long term." 9 The
s Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 509; Council Directive 2003/51/EC, art. 1, § 14(b), at 18.
4 Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 510.
s The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (Eng.). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
6Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 515. In British elocution, these individuals would
be referred to as "members."
81 Id. See CO. L. REV. STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT xi (2001) [hereinafter CLR STEERING GROUP FINAL REPORT].
" Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 515 (quoting ROGER COwE, ASS'N OF CHARTERED
CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STAKEHOLDER CHALLENGE 20
(2001)). See CLR STEERING GROUP FINAL REPORT, supra note 87, at xi. The report reads:
Our law should provide the maximum possible freedom combined with
the transparency necessary to ensure the responsible and accountable
use of that freedom .... [Clompany law should reflect the reality of the
modern corporate economy, where those who run successful companies
recognise the need to develop positive relationships with a wide range
of interests beyond shareholders-such as employees, suppliers and
customers.
Id.
89 Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 516; CLR STEERING GROUP FINAL REPORT, supra
note 87, at xvii.
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mechanism on which we focus is its recommendation that the previously
voluntary OFR be made mandatory. 90 It suggested that all companies of
"significant economic size" be required to prepare an OFR as part of
their Annual Report and Accounts, and that the OFR "provide a review
of the business, its performance, plans and prospects, and information
the directors judge necessary for an understanding of the business, such
as relationships with employees, suppliers and customers, environmental
and community impact, corporate governance and management of risk."91
The British government "reacted favorably to many of the CLR
Steering Group's proposals, including the OFR initiative."92 Ultimately,
on March 21, 2005, the statute enacting it was passed.9 3 In its introduction
to a set of draft regulations in 2004, the Government gave a number of
examples of the sort of information that corporate directors might deter-
mine should be disclosed in the OFR, including:
an explanation of risk management approaches em-
ployed by a company that stores, transports or uses
significant volumes of hazardous or toxic substances
that risk damaging the health of workers or others,
or polluting the environment;
94
* how a company that is a heavy user of natural re-
sources, which may become scarce or the price of
which may change significantly, is intending to
reduce its dependency on such resources;95
* how a company that may be susceptible to the im-
pacts of climate change plans to mitigate the risks
and take advantage of the opportunities presented
by a changing climate;96
90 See CLR STEERING GRouP FINAL REPORT, supra note 87, at xix.
91 Id. at xix, 49.
92 Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 516-17.
93See The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors' Report etc.)
Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 (U.K.), available at httpJ/www.opsi.gov.ukSI/si2005/
2005 1011.htm. For further discussion of the interim steps in this process, and in particular
the quite important redefinition of "materiality" that was part of the OFR process, see
Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 515-23.
" U.K. Dep't of Trade & Indus., Draft Regulations on the Operating and Financial
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current and likely future compliance record for com-
panies that are operationally dependent upon legal
consents for discharges to air, land or water;9 7 and
an explanation of the risk management approaches
employed by a company to assess the operational im-
pact on biodiversity where failure to avoid or mitigate
damage would put development consents at risk.98
These examples illustrate the impressive breadth of social and
environmental risk disclosure expected pursuant to the OFR require-
ments. In conjunction with the "detailed financial statements in a com-
pany's annual report," OFRs were intended "to explain to the outside
world clearly and conciselyjust how the directors were running the busi-
ness and to provide an understanding of its operating environment, par-
ticularly the opportunities and threats it faces."99 Consequently, OFRs
would combine expanded risk disclosure with financial information and
the directors' views, thereby mirroring, and expanding upon, management
discussion and analysis ("MD&A") of financial results in the U.S.. Thus,
it was clear that social reporting had come of age via the OFR regulations.
The implementing legislation required the directors of a quoted
company to prepare an OFR for financial years beginning on or after
April 1, 2005, and so the first OFRs pursuant to the statutory requirement
would have been issued beginning in April of 2006.1°° In May of 2005, the
Accounting Standards Board issued a Reporting Standard concerning
OFRs ("Standard"), which "requires directors to prepare an OFR ad-
dressed to members, setting out their analysis of the business, with a
forward-looking orientation in order to assist members to assess the
strategies adopted by the entity. ... ." It set out the essential principles
to which OFRs must adhere; according to the standard, they must
"complement and supplement... [company's] financial statements[,] be




" Phillips & Wyman, supra note 3.
0o See The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors' Report
etc.) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 (U.K), available at httpJ/www.opsi.gov.uk/S/si2005/
20051011.htm.
101 See AcCT. STANDARDS BOARD, REPORTING STANDARD 1: OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REv-
IEW 3 (2005), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/ACF345.pdf.
102 Id. at 3.
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The core of the Standard was contained in paragraphs twenty-
eight through thirty, which state:
28. The OFR shall provide information to assist mem-
bers to assess the strategies adopted by the entity
and the potential for those strategies to succeed.
The key elements of the disclosure framework nec-
essary to achieve this are:
a. the nature of the business, including a descrip-
tion of the market, competitive and regulatory
environment in which the entity operates, and
the entity's objectives and strategies;
b. the development and performance of the
business, both in the financial year under
review and in the future;
c. the resources, principal risks and uncertain-
ties and relationships that may affect the
entity's long-term value; and
d. position of the business including a descrip-
tion of the capital structure, treasury policies
and objectives and liquidity of the entity,
both in the financial year under review and
the future.
Details of particular matters
29. To the extent necessary to meet the requirements
set out in paragraph 28 above, the OFR shall in-
clude information about:
a. environmental matters (including the im-
pact of the business of the entity on the
environment);
b. the entity's employees;
c. social and community issues;
d. persons with whom the entity has contrac-
tual or other arrangements which are essen-
tial to the business of the entity;
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e. receipts from, and returns to, members of the
entity in respect of shares held by them; and
f. all other matters the directors consider to
be relevant.
30. For items (a) to (c) in paragraph 29, the OFR shall, in
particular, include:
a. The policies of the entity in each area men-
tioned; and
b. the extent to which those policies have been
successfully implemented.
1 3
The Standard also stated that "to the extent necessary to meet
the requirements set out in paragraph 28 ... , the OFR shall include the
key performance indicators, both financial and, where appropriate, non-
financial, used by the directors to assess progress against their stated
objectives."10 4 Given the OFR requirement's derivation from risk man-
agement and reporting standards, it is not surprising that the Standard
included elements of these disciplines. For example, one paragraph in the
Standard required company OFRs to "include a description of the prin-
cipal risks and uncertainties facing the entity, together with a commen-
tary on the directors' approach to them."0 5 It also required discussion of
stakeholder relationships and an analysis of specific aspects of a com-
pany's financial position, including capital structure, treasury policies,
cash flows, current and prospective liquidity, and key performance indi-
cators. " 6 The Standard emphasized, though, that nothing in it required
the disclosure of matters in negotiation if such disclosure, in the eyes of
the directors, could be prejudicial to the company. 10 7
Altogether, the Standard provided a comprehensive and intel-
ligent framework for forward-looking disclosure of a company's strategy,
goals, risks, opportunities, financial performance, and expectations for the
future. The framework also gave companies the opportunity to discuss the
social and environmental factors that might have an impact on future
'
03 Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted). Paragraphs twenty-nine and thirty "reflect the wording
in the OFR Regulations." Id. at 12.
'4MId. at 14.
1
05 Id. at 16-17.
106 See id. at 18-22.
107 See id. at 22.
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financial performance. Given problems with financial reporting in the
recent past, particularly in the United States, the OFR regulations and
Operating Standard seem to have advanced an intelligent policy that
would elicit exactly the sorts of information investors ought to have
when judging a company's prospects. Its demise as a statutory require-
ment was, therefore, unfortunate.
II. THE OFR U-TURN
Confidential memos on the Treasury Department's website, posted
as a result of litigation threatened by Friends of the Earth, give a unique
view into the decision-making process preceding the u-turn. The very
posting of the memos seems itself to be an indication of the value of trans-
parency in promoting accountability. Although, in this instance, the docu-
ments do not show the Treasury Department's decision-making in a part-
icularly favorable light, the episode provides an excellent example of the
direct relationship between transparency and accountability in a demo-
cracy. The U.K. Government ought to be commended for its disclosure.
In a 2005 letter to Friends of the Earth, Adam Chapman, writing
for the Treasury Solicitor, described the process that led to the decision as
having started in July 2005 when "officials at HM Treasury were asked
to identify deregulatory opportunities."l° Yet, one might infer from meet-
ing notes released to Friends of the Earth that the actual idea to scrap
the OFR was suggested earlier, specifically in a June 8, 2005 meeting be-
tween someone from Hermes, an institutional fund manager, and uniden-
tified HM Treasury officials.0 9 The meeting note reads, in its entirety:
Hermes note (08/06):
He thinks the OFR is colossally over-engineered and says
this is also what the accountants are saying. If we wanted
deregulatory win with appeal to big business, a radical
symbolic stripping-down of the OFR would go down in-
credibly well. I see his point. Is it feasible?"
" Letter from Adam Chapman for the Treasury Solicitor to Phil Michaels, Friends of the
Earth 8 (Dec. 22,2005), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/BB6/Bl/easc
preactionresponse020306.pdf.
109 HM Treasury Meeting Notes, supra note 6.
110 Id.
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It seems ironic that Hermes was the apparent author of this suggestion.
Hermes is independent of any other financial services group,"' avoiding
many conflicts of interest faced by other fund managers here in the U.S.,
like Magellan or Vanguard." 2 It describes itself as follows:
We invest funds on behalf of around 240 clients including
pension funds, insurance companies, government entities[,J
and financial institutions, as well as charities and endow-
ments. However, Hermes' largest client is the BT Pension
Scheme (BTPS) who, as owner of Hermes, gives its invest-
ment management perspective a unique insight and close
alignment to the needs of other long-term investors and
especially pension funds." 3
Hermes invests in underperforming companies that are funda-
mentally sound and works with them to turn things around." 4 Moreover,
scholars have credited Hermes for being explicit about the need for inves-
tors to establish long-term relationships with companies and for compa-
nies to "manage effectively relationships with their employees, suppliers [,J
and customers" as well as to provide high ethical standards and "environ-
mentally and socially responsible behaviour .... " 5 The kind of thoughtful
management and long-term perspective that the OFR sought to encourage
would seem to be precisely what a firm like Hermes would favor. It is
possible that Hermes perceived a potential competitive disadvantage if
the kind of knowledge it developed in its "long-term relationships with
companies" became more freely available. That explanation is supported
by a published quote of Hermes' Associate Director for Governance and
Engagement, Paul Lee, who broke ranks with most institutional investors
and supported the OFR u-turn, asserting that information should be
available based on "[dliscussions [that] should be between two parties:
111 See Hermes Pensions Management Limited, About Hermes: Introduction, http://www
.hermes.co.uk/aboutlintroduction.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
112 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L. J. 269 (2003) (discussing conflicts of
interest on Wall Street).
"3 See About Hermes: Introduction, supra note 111.
"
4 See John Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy and
the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 531, 548 (2003).
115 Id. at 548.
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companies and their owners who should be able to develop practical guid-
ance and best practice between them."116
Once the suggestion to scrap the OFR requirements was planted,
it took root quickly. Soon after the meeting with Hermes, HM Treasury
completed a policy and political analysis of the potential effects of drop-
ping the OFR requirements. Treasury concluded that, after an "odd moan"
about the wasted expense of having begun to prepare annual OFRs,
117
the main challenge would be dealing with possible "handling issues.""'
Treasury predicted that "[c] hanging the requirement so soon would be per-
ceived in some quarters as a U-turn""19 and "muddled Government policy
in this area."2 ° But it also divined that businesses would welcome the
OFR pull-back,' 2 ' which ended up being largely correct. An editorial writer
for the Times of London, a publication that which represents the most con-
servative strand of British business opinion, praised the decision, writing
"[tihe Government's decision to repent on this nonsense is to be wel-
comed."'22 The Confederation of British Industry also pronounced itself
"delighted" by the decision.'23
On balance, however, the response from business appeared tepid.
Treasury's own analysis recognized that the OFR requirements were "in-
tended to increase transparency in reporting and ha[d] been welcomed,
or at least accepted, by most stakeholders, including directly affected
businesses."'24 Indeed, Miles Templeman, the director-general of the
Institute of Directors, "concede [d] the scrapping of the OFRs has had a
mixed reaction among his members." 2 ' Also, Peter Montagnon of the
116 Clare Bettelley, Investors Lobby Government to Promote OFR, FIN. WEEK, Mar. 24,
2006, http://www.financeweek.co.uk/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=3421&d=pnd&h=pndh&f=pndf.
... Note to Chancellor on OFR Deregulatory Opportunity, supra note 16, at 5.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See HM Treasury, Operating and Financial Review: Internal Discussion Note 6 (Sept.
29,2005), http'//hm-treasury.gov.uldmedia/BB5/CF/eascadvice29septL020306.pdf [herein-
after OFR Internal Discussion Note].
121 See generally id.
122 See Patience Wheatcroft, Editorial, Putting an End to the Numbers Game, TIMES
(London), Nov. 29, 2005, at 41.
" See Larry Elliott & Ashley Seager, Brown Pledges to Cut Red Tape in Drive to Woo
Industry, GUARDIAN, Nov. 28, 2005, at 1, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/
0,,1652097,00.html (describing CBI's sentiment that the OFR requirements were "three
times as tough as required by Brussels and would put British firms at a disadvantage
against European rivals").124 See OFR Internal Discussion Note, supra note 120, at 1.
125 See James Blitz, Red Tape Removal Proves Controversial, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30. 2005, at 3,
available at httpJ/search.ft.com/searchArticlejavascriptEnabled=true&id=051130000917.
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Association of British Insurers wrote that he supported proposals to
ensure "the kind of high-quality narrative reporting that investors and
companies wanted to see out of [OFRs] but without imposing unaccept-
able burdens of cost or potential liability."'26
In the end, few business interests publicly criticized the decision,
with the exceptions of insurers,'27 human resources directors,128 and public
relations specialists.'29 Although executives in companies that are CSR
leaders often say in private interviews that they would welcome regulation
to produce a level playing field, they rarely express that view publicly.
In general, companies are loath to get too far in front of their respective
industries on CSR issues. 3 '
126 Miles Templeman & Peter Montagnon, Letter to the Editor, Companies Should Be
Encouraged to Continue with OFR, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at 18.
127 See, e.g., Jean Eagleshamand & Kate Burgess, Reporting Rule U-Tin Comes Under Fire,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at 2, available at http'/www.ft.com/cms/s/27ab4da4-607c-llda-
a3a6-0000779e2340.html (quoting Peter Montagnon as saying, "[wle're baffled, bewildered
and rather disappointed" by the OFR u-turn). The Association of British Insurers' members
hold approximately one-quarter of the U.K equity market. See Williams & Conley, supra note
2, at 536-38 (citing statistic on share ownership in the U.K.). These comments would seem to
indicate the commitment of the British insurance interest to their role as investors.
12' Such directors saw the value of developing better metrics for the value of a company's
human capital. See Richard Donkin, For Once, Bureaucracy that is Good for Business,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005, at 9. Donkin asserts that the case for OFR reporting and human
capital measurement is strong: "The vital signs of a healthy company are the attitudes,
skill, knowledge and approaches of its employees." Id. He also reported speaking with mem-
bers of the HR Society in London, where "there seemed to be general dismay at the chan-
cellor's decision but a determination, also, that companies should continue to develop their
use and application of employee metrics." Id.
129 Such specialists had an obvious economic interest in expanded communications re-
quirements. See, e.g., Tom Williams, CIPR Attacks DTI over OFR U-Turn, PRWEEK, Jan.
27, 2006, at 3 ("CIPR head of... [Public Affairs] Francis Ingham this week described the
Government's decision to rescind the OFR... as 'surprising and unhelpful.'") CIPR is an
acronym for the Chartered Institute for Public Relations. See About the CIPR, http:ll
www.ipr.org.uk/About/aboutframeset.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
30 See, e.g., Ruth V. Aquilera et al., Putting the "S" Back in CSR: A Multi-level Theory of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 32ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. (forthcoming July 2007) (develop-
ing a theoretical model for understanding companies' motivations to initiate CSR programs
and asserting that, because companies' relational motivations within their industries can
be stronger than their competitive, self-interested motivations, companies do not compete
on CSR grounds to the extent otherwise expected); Pratima Bansal & Kendall Roth, Why
Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological Responsiveness, 43 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 717,
727-28 (2000) (discussing the results of interviews with executives in 53 firms in five in-
dustries and reporting that there exists tremendous field cohesion, that industries have
strong social norms that are imposed within the industry, and that companies express the
view that they do not want to lead or be out front on environmental issues).
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Treasury's political analysis further assumed that investors would
be "neutral to broadly supportive" of the pull-back,13' beliefs that subse-
quent events proved to be widely off the mark.132 The political analysis
did predict opposition, 133 which it assumed would be from "environmental
groups[,] trade unions,"134 and from the "significant lobby" of CSR groups.135
The main task Treasury perceived was to "balance the concerns of CSR
groups, environmental groups, and unions, with those of investors and
businesses."136 Treating the concerns of those interests as in simple
opposition to each other, however, ignored the trends in London over the
past ten years, where many institutional investors and some businesses
had incorporated the concerns of CSR activists into their strategies. 37
At the time this policy change was being considered by Treasury,
the U.K., like the rest of Europe, was under a directive from the EU to
improve narrative reporting and forward-looking information. 13 The de-
cision within Treasury was framed as a choice between the OFR as it had
developed versus a roll-back to the impliedly less-demanding Directive.
39
The Directive and the OFR were in fact very similar in several important
respects. They used parallel language, with the OFR regulations drawing
substantially from the Directive's language, even though the OFR process
had begun earlier. Both required the discussion of "environmental, social,
and employee matters 'to the extent necessary' to provide an informed
understanding of [a] company's strategic development, performance, current
position, and future risks and uncertainties."4 ° Both required the use of
"key performance indicators" for financial matters, and for non-financial
matters such as the environment or employee issues "where appropriate"
to provide a balanced and comprehensive analysis.'4 ' Significantly, how
3 Note to Chancellor on OFR Deregulatory Opportunity, supra note 16, at 5.
132 See infra Part III.
1 See OFR Internal Discussion Note, supra note 120, at 6.
' See id. at 1.
135 Id. at 5.
136 Id.
137 See, e.g., The Case for Corporate Social Responsibility, MAD.CO.UK, Apr. 2,2007, http://
www.mad.co.uk/Main/News/Disciplines/Marketing/Articles/cl l37acb5ffl44108bf0f68c
213ba4flThe-case-for-corporate-social-responsibility.html (reporting that"[i]n 1998,28%
of UK consumers considered good corporate social responsibility to be an important pur-
chasing decision factor. By 2002, this figure had risen to 44%").
13 See Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 505-09 (discussing harmonization of company
law in the EU, and its Accounts Modernization Directive ("Directive")).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 522.
141 Compare Directive 2003/51/EC, supra note 80, with The Companies Act 1985 (Operating
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ever, the reporting requirements of the OFR were much more specific than
those of the Directive, particularly as the OFR requirements had been
defined by the Accounting Standards Board's Standard.142 Consequently,
the OFR pull-back has left companies and their accountants with less
guidance on how to conform their reporting to law, although they can cer-
tainly continue to use the Standard on a voluntary basis.
HM Treasury's analysis assumed that the primary cost savings
to companies from scaling back the OFR would come from adopting the
less onerous auditing standard of the Directive. The Directive requires
an audit opinion that the expanded narrative report is consistent with the
accounts, while the OFR would have required an opinion that nothing
came to the auditor's attention that was inconsistent with the OFR.
143
According to a Treasury memo, "[t]he argument is that information about
the fuller picture is not verifiable against accounts and so other sources
need to be considered. OFRs capture more of this sort of information than
the expanded directors' report, which is why only OFRs would be sub-
jected to the higher assurance standard."1" Using DTI figures for the ad-
ditional costs of this audit requirement-an extra £29.3 million in total,
or £22,713 per company' 45-Treasury determined the extra value of the
OFR was not worth the additional cost:
There is no question that a statutory, and more compre-
hensively audited, OFR has clear benefits but we are not
persuaded that the cost to quoted companies justifies this
level of regulation. Rolling back to the requirements of the
EU Accounts Modernisation Directive minima would re-
duce business costs... [but] would nonetheless still result
in an appreciable improvement in narrative reporting (com-
pared to the pre-statutory OFR situation). A substantial
and Financial Review and Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 §
234ZZB(3) (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2OO5/20051011.htm.
112 Compare Directive 2003/5 IIEC, supra note 80, with The Companies Act 1985 (Operating
and Financial Review and Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, S.1. 2005/1011 (U.K.),
available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2005/20051011 .htm.
143 Compare Directive 2003/51/EC, supra note 80, with The Companies Act 1985 (Operating
and Financial Review and Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 § 235
(U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SIsi2005/20051011.htm.
14 OFR Internal Discussion Note, supra note 120, at 4.
145 Id. at 5.
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part of the benefits identified by the DTI (including en-
hanced credibility and improved investor relations, lower
average cost of capital and more liquid capital markets)
should still be realised. 146
Treasury's analysis seems suspect on several grounds. First, its
assessment of the relative burdens of the two standards seems backwards.
The OFR standard appeared not to trigger any duty unless the auditor
had actually seen something that was inconsistent with the company's
representations in its OFR. 47 In other words, it did not appear to create
any affirmative duty to investigate. By comparison, the Directive's stan-
dard appears much more open-ended, with its requirement that the com-
pany's narrative report be adjudged consistent with accounts. 4 ' Second,
the cost estimates, which are curiously specific to the last pound, strike
us as speculative at best. The internal Treasury memos mention a need
to confirm these figures with DTI,'49 but there is no evidence that this
actually happened.
Even if the Treasury's analysis of burden were correct, one might
be forgiven for thinking that £22,713 per company is a fairly modest price
to pay for the benefits DTI had identified from the OFR--enhanced credi-
bility, improved investor relations, lower average cost of capital, and more
liquid capital markets. 5 ° As one member of the Company Law Reform
Steering Group wrote:
The worst kind of dumbing down of company law
was how one eminent lawyer described to me the chancel-
lor's decision last week to scrap the operating and financial
review. The worst of it is that this policymaking on the hoof
will do little to simplify regulation or reduce costs for UK
business-the supposed [pound sterling] 30m of savings
146 Note to Chancellor of HM Treasury on Operating and Financial Review (OFR) Regu-
lations: Proposal to Roll-Back to EU Minima 7 (Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Note to Chan-
cellor on OFR Proposal to Roll-Back], available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/
BB5/C2/eascadvicel lnov020306.pdf.
117 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
14' See supra notes143 and accompanying text.
149 OFR Internal Discussion Note, supra note 120, at 5 ("[This increment seems unusually large.
We need to confirm that the DTI RIA [regulatory impact analysis] did not make an error."); Note
to Chancellor on OFR Deregulatory Opportunity, supra note 16, at 1 n.1 ("Note-all costs taken
from DTI RIA, dated 8 October 2004. These costs should be verified with DTI.")
150 See OFR Internal Discussion Note, supra note 120, at 1.
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has a very plucked from the air look about it-because
listed companies will still have to produce a similar docu-
ment to comply with the European Union's accounts mod-
ernisation directive.
This calls for more social and environmental report-
ing. Yet it will not contain the forward looking information
required by the OFR on business prospects. Nor will it en-
courage a proper discussion of those business drivers and
risks that are not captured by historic cost accounting,
which was a vital part of the OFR's purpose.''
III. REACTIONS TO THE OFR U-TURN
If this were simply an example of a government policy choice that
miscalculated the politics of a situation, it might not be very interesting,
and it certainly would not be unique. Yet, the way that the Treasury de-
partment miscalculated the politics of the situation makes this worth
exploring, as are the implications for corporate governance. First, the in-
terests of the accountancy profession were not mentioned in the October
11, 2005 analysis of whether to scrap the OFR."21 By November 11, 2005,
when the decision was final and Treasury was working out "handling
issues," Treasury had recognized that the "audit profession may have con-
cerns about reducing the scope of corporate reporting and loss of an an-
ticipated workflow.""' This, however, understated the affected interests
quite substantially.
While the accounting profession certainly had financial interests
in the OFR regulations, its commitment to them cannot be fairly described
as purely mercenary. Part of the commitment was historical; the require-
ments had originated in the accountancy profession, and its members had
been influential in shaping it. For example, the Turnbull Committee's guid-
ance report on internal control, a project of.the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales, had first argued that businesses
should identify and manage a wide range of business risks and also eval-
uate internal controls with respect to those risks. 4 A report on the
151 John Plender, Out of the OFR Mess, FIN. TIMES, Dec 5, 2005, at 26.
152 See Note to Chancellor on OFR Deregulatory Opportunity, supra note 16.
153 Id. at 3.
154 See INST. OF CHARTERED ACCT. IN ENG. AND WALES, IMPLEMENTING TURNBULL: A
BOARDROOM BRIEFING 4 (1999), available at http://www.icaew.co.uk/index.cfm?route=
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implementation of Turnbull concluded that "the [Turnbull] guidance has
contributed to a marked improvement in the overall standard of risk man-
agement and internal control since 1999, "155 and, considering the October,
2005 date, ironically concluded that "[t aken together with the Operating
and Financial Review, the internal control statement [in the annual re-
port] provides an opportunity for the board to help shareholders under-
,,156stand the risk and control issues facing the company ....
As these statements suggest, accountants had embraced the im-
portance of enhanced reporting as a technique for improving company
management and producing better information for investors. Literally
days before the OFR pull-back, the Association of Chartered Certified
Accountants ("ACCA"), an international association of 105,000 accountants,
published a report on how expanded reporting could "drive the business
forward.""5 7 Letters written by accountants or officials in accountancy
organizations in response to Treasury's decision emphasized the business
benefits of the OFR, not the social or environmental aspects of the en-
hanced reporting. 5 ' A letter from Seamus Gillen of Glenfen, the reputation
120612. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance is a synthesis of influential cor-
porate governance analyses and recommendations of Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel, and
Higgs, and includes the London Stock Exchange's requirements that listed companies
comply or explain their non-compliance with the Code. See FIN. REP. COUNCIL, COMBINED
CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE pmbl. para. 4 (2003) [hereinafter FRC, COMBINED CODE],
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr-comcode2003.pdf.
155 FIN. REP. COUNCIL, INTERNAL CONTROL: REVISED GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS ON THE
COMBINED CODE 1 (2005) [hereinafter FRC, INTERNAL CONTROL], available at http://www
.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Revised%20Turnbull%2OGuidance%200ctober
%202005.pdf.
156 Id. at 2.
157 ASS'N OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCT., OPINION PAPER: OFR, STRATEGY AND REPUTATION
3 (2005), available at http://www.accaglobal.com/pdfs/tech-sar-002.pdf.
15 See, e.g., Tony Good & John Rogers, Letter to the Editor, Chancellor has Given Succour
to Businesses That Do Not Wish to Explain or to be Held Accountable, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2005, at 18. According to Good:
The OFR is not inherently prescriptive; it is not focused solely on social
aid environmental strategies and is not an example of the European
gold plating that so concerns the chancellor.
The OFR was a carefully evaluated proposal arising from the Company
Law Review, and has commanded a broad measure of support, especially
from investors.
Id. See also David Phillips & Peter Wyman, Letter to the Editor, Do Not Confuse Good
Practice with Red Tape, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 6, 2005, http://www.financialexpress-bd.com/
index3.asp?cnd=12/6/2005&sectionid=4&newsid=9002&spcl=no ("The OFR was never
designed to replace the detailed financial statements in a company's annual report, but
rather to give a complementary and user-friendly overview of business-critical issues to
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and risk management consultancy which collaborated with ACCA in its
study, represents the typical perspective:
The reason the chancellor's decision has been met with
such dismay, including a challenge from the floor of the
CBI conference itself, is because many companies perceived
the advantages OFR-style reporting would bring. Apart
from the increased transparency generated by stronger
levels of disclosure, our work with companies confirmed
that they saw the opportunity for using the exercise to
drive improvements in performance, and to produce tan-
gible benefits that exceeded the costs.159
The Financial Reporting Council ("FRC"), the "unified, independ-
ent regulator" for corporate reporting and governance in the U.K., com-
prised of "the Accounting Standards Board, the Auditing Practices Board,
the Financial Reporting Review Panel, the Accountancy Investigation and
Discipline Board, and the Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy"
put out a frosty press release on November 29, 2005.160 In it, the FRC
"noted the announcement made.., by the Chancellor of the Exchequer"
and, in a model of understatement, stated that "[t]he announcement has
implications for a number of the FRC's operating bodies."' 1 After promising
to make further announcements "[a] s the Government's detailed plans for
removing the statutory requirement for the OFR (while retaining the
requirement for an enhanced business review in the director's report) become
clearer," 62 the FRC provided a cogent summary of the profession's views:
enable readers to reach a better informed view of the company's performance."); Charles
Tilley, Opinion, A Lost Opportunity on Reporting Rules, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at 19.
Without a form of narrative reporting such as the OFR, business report-
ing remains essentially backward looking and focused on historical fi-
nancial statements. The financial statements do not-and cannot-cover
strategy, intangible assets, prospects, opportunities[,] and risks. One
of the key objectives of the OFR is to assist members [investors] "to
assess the strategies adopted by the entity and the potential for those
strategies to succeed."
Id.
"' See Seamus Gillen, Letter to the Editor, A Setback in Search for Growing Trust, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at 22.






The FRC has long believed that the publication of a narra-
tive explanation of a company's development, performance,
position and prospects should be encouraged as an impor-
tant element of best practice in corporate reporting. The
ASB first produced a statement of best practice in 1993
(updated in 2003). A significant number of FTSE 100 com-
panies already publish an OFR. Regardless of whether or
not an OFR is a statutory requirement, the FRC's view of
best practice remains unchanged.... [The ASB's Reporting
Standard] is the most up-to-date and authoritative good
source of best practice guidance for companies to follow." 3
HM Treasury entirely missed the accountancy profession's intel-
lectual commitment to risk management and internal control, an action
that is particularly frustrating in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley world where
many U.S.-listed British companies need to discuss their internal financial
controls anyway. Indeed, Treasury was stunningly obtuse in ignoring the
accountants' embrace of the OFR as part of a process to force boards of
listed companies to think carefully about a broad range of potential risks
to company strategy, operations, and reputation.
Treasury, in addition, badly misread investor sentiment on the
OFR regulations, thinking that investors would be "neutral to broadly
supportive."'64 Some investors clearly were sympathetic, or at least not
particularly opposed, to the roll-back. As noted above, Hermes was cited
in Treasury documents as a source supporting the idea of the roll-
back. 165 Treasury said that its analysis was based on a poll in which 34%
of investors had opposed the original proposals. 66 However, that same
poll showed that 41% of fund managers said that they supported the
proposal.'67 From a qualitative perspective, the intensity of support of
those investors who saw value in the OFR requirements has been higher
than the intensity of opposition of those who did not. As the Financial
Times put the point:
163Id.
16 Note to Chancellor on OFR Deregulatory Opportunity, supra note 16, at 5.
165 See Letter from Adam Chapman, supra note 108.
"' Note to Chancellor on OFR Deregulatory Opportunity, supra note 16, at 5.
167 See id.
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[Tihe [OFRI concept is popular with investors and many
leading companies already include an OFR in their an-
nual reports.
Mr. Brown's decision to scrap the OFR at this late
stage shows a poor grasp of the difference between neces-
sary government regulation and superfluous red tape.16
Consequently, investors and investor organizations, as the accoun-
tants had, immediately burst into print with criticism of the decision.
For example, the lead sentence of one November 29, 2005 article read:
"Gordon Brown was lambasted by investors, accountants and environ-
mentalists yesterday for abandoning plans to force listed companies to
disclose more about their operations."169 Investors were quoted in the
article as being "surprised and disappointed,"17 ° and in a later article were
described as being "aghast."' 7' The November 30th letter to the editor by
Tony Good, Chairman of the Accounting Advocacy Committee, and John
Rogers, Chief Executive of the U.K. Society of Investment Professionals,
is illustrative of the tenor of many such comments:
At a time when the introduction of international financial
reporting standards has concerned many that financial
reports are becoming less coherent, it seems very strange
to play down a measure that provides a coherent frame-
work for explaining the results and management's strate-
gies for the business....
... To conclude-at this very late stage and in the face of
the needs of the investor community-that such an ini-
tiative is burdensome "red tape," is frankly absurd.'72
168 Editorial, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at 18 ("Worse
[than the news that the Chancellor was going to study 'why Britain gold-plates so much
European regulation'] was his unexpected decision to abolish what he surprisingly de-
scribed as an example of goldplating-the operating and financial review.").
169 Patrick Hosking, Chancellor's U-turn Over Reviews Sparks Fury, TIMES ONLINE, Nov.
29, 2005, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/,,9063-1895293,00.html.
'
70 Id. (quoting Anita Skipper, head of governance at Morley, "which invests £148 billion
on behalf of Norwich Union policyholders").
171 Robert Bruce, Who Thrived and Suffered Through 2005, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at 14
(describing analysts, companies, and investors as being "aghast" with the OFR pull-back).
172 Good & Rogers, supra note 158, at 18.
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The Treasury's analysis missed an important shift among many
investors in the U.K.. These investors increasingly understand that com-
panies must manage a wide range of potential risks, including social,
environmental, and business probity risks.173 As investors, they want in-
formation that shows them that their companies have an intelligent risk
management system in place. Management's improper handling of social
and environmental issues would seem to be one reason for institutional
investors to intervene with management to fulfill institutions' fiduciary
duties to their shareholders. But by perceiving social and environmental
concerns to be inevitably in opposition to financial and business concerns,
Treasury failed to comprehend the extent to which sophisticated investors
in London now understand the direct connections between the two.174
Treasury was correct in one aspect of its political analysis: that
environmentalists, trade unions, and other groups would oppose its de-
cision. 175 As expected, those groups also burst into print with astonish-
ment and outrage.176 That outrage reached its apogee with Friends of the
173 See, e.g., INT'L LIBRARY OF ENVTL. ECON. AND POLICY, CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR
MANAGING ENvIRONMENTAL RISKS 1 (2004), available at https://depot.erudit.org/retrieve/
904/2004s-43.pdf.
174 See, e.g., ASS'N OF BRMSH INSURERS, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES ON SOcIALLY-REsPoNsILE
INvESTMENT 1-4 (2003), available at http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc7_l.PDF (discussing
the disclosure expected of public companies on social, environmental, ethical, and economic
issues); INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS COMM., THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDERS AND AGENTS-STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1 (2005), available at http'ilwww.
manifest.co.uk/linkssearchlStatementofPrinciplesRevisedFinalSeptember2005ll .pdf.
The Institutional Shareholders' Committee is comprised of the Association of British
Insurers, the National Association of Pension Funds, and the Investment Management
Association, representing an overwhelming majority of institutional funds under man-
agement. See generally Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 536-47 (discussing this shift in
thinking amongst many institutional investors in London).
... Note to Chancellor on OFR Deregulatory Opportunity, supra note 16, at 1.
176 See, e.g., Deborah Doane & Brendan Barber, Letter to the Editor, Government Has a Lot
to Explain on OFR Abolition, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at 22 ("Gordon Brown's announce-
ment that the government is to abolish the newly introduced operating and financial re-
view is a slap in the face for those trying to ensure that business is more accountable for
its wider impacts on society and the environment .... ."); Jill Treanor & Mark Milner,
Brown Plan to Cut Red Tape for Business Provokes Chorus of Disapproval, GUARDIAN,
Nov. 29,2005, http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,, 1653143,00.html ("Gordon Brown's
efforts to mend the Labour government's relationship with big business backfired spectacu-
larly yesterday when the centrepiece of his proposals to cut red tape ran into a chorus of
criticism from an unlikely alliance of business leaders, City investors, trade unions and
green activists.").
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Earth's almost immediate turn to litigation, 77 filing a press release on
December 7, 2005 stating its belief that the decision was "procedurally
unfair, irrational/perverse, a breach of legitimate expectation.., based
upon material errors of fact," and thus "unlawful."78
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE STATUS IN 2006
The withdrawal of the OFR left a "policy vacuum." 79 Given the
need to pass legislation to conform with the EU Accounts Modernization
Directive, the Government could not just lie low and wait out the bad
press. 80 Rather, it had to do something to develop the requirements for
the Business Review. Moreover, because the Companies Bill' 8 ' contained
references to the OFR requirements, the Government needed to bring for-
ward amendments to that Bill, which had been introduced in the House
of Lords on November 1, 2005.182 Thus, on December 15, 2005, DTI Minister
Alan Michael "invit[ed] views from interested parties by 15th February"
about the Companies Bill amendments, and requirements for the Business
Review, even as he clarified the reporting requirements for businesses in
light of the OFR withdrawal.
8 3
The "clarification" was a model of trying to appease all factions, start-
ing with its commitment to business "not to impose regulatory requirements
on U.K. businesses over and above relevant EU Directive requirements,"'84
or in the current British jargon, not to "gold-plate" such Directives. The
U.K. government then extended a tentative olive branch to civil society
by recognizing the importance of companies reporting on "non-financial
177 See Jean Eaglesham, Legal Challenge on Brown's U-Turn, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005,
at 3 ("The legal action is likely to fuel the controversy about the last-minute abolition of
the rules, which was welcomed by business groups as a deregulatory step but has been
attacked by investors, trade unions and green lobbyists.").
178 Press Release, Friends of the Earth, Brown Faces Legal Challenge After Scrapping OFR
(Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press-releases/brownfaces
_egal chalenge_07122005.html.
179 Barney Jopson, Brown's U- Turn on Reporting Defended as a Recalibration, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at 2.
180 See Council Directive 2003/51/EC, supra note 80.
181 This became The Companies Act, 2006. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
'
8 2 See U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Company Law Reform: Small Business
Summary, http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23007.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
" Alun Michael, Minister for Industry and the Regions, Written Ministerial Statement,





issues relevant to the development and performance of the business, includ-
ing, for example, environmental matters and human capital management,
and they will need to do so under the Business Review requirements."'s5
It also tried to mollify the large proportion of companies that had been
in the process of preparing their first mandatory OFRs:
Companies that have been preparing to produce an OFR
will be able to use that work to produce their Business
Review. In addition, many companies have been producing
a voluntary OFR from some years, and may wish to con-
tinue doing so using work that they have done toward the
mandatory OFR. Or they may use that work to improve
the quality and depth of their Business Review.8 6
This statement went down about as well as the original Treasury
decision. In his comments accompanying the above so-called clarifica-
tion, DTI Minister Michael said that "[g]iven the nature of the proposed
change, which is a recalibration of existing policy rather than a funda-
mental change, and given the extensive evidence collected in the recent
consultation process on this issue, it was not considered necessary to carry
out further public consultation [on the legislation repealing the OFRI .ps7
Calling this policy reversal a "recalibration" is "rather like Napoleon pre-
senting the retreat from Moscow as a 'slight change of plan,'" quipped
Mark Goyder of Tomorrow's Company.' He explained his view thusly:
Over the next five years forward-looking statements will be-
come universal around the world. We need rigour in measur-
ing and reporting on the values and behaviours that are es-
sential to the creation of enduring shareholder value. Invest-
ors need to have their finger on the pulse of relationships
with customers, employees and suppliers. The OFR stand-
ard offers a clear, understandable framework for moving
into this new generation of reporting. Companies that
have already put in the work have told us that the OFR is
18 5 Id.
186Id.
"87 Barney Jopson, Brown's U-Turn on Reporting Rule Defended as a 'Recalibration', FIN.
TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 2005, at 2.
"s Mark Goyder, Letter to the Editor, Irony of 'Slight Change of Plan' Over OFR, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at 18.
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strengthening their focus on strategy and their selection
of the right performance indicators.
The irony of the "recalibration" is that companies
are left with most of the work to comply with a European
Union directive, but with added uncertainty and fewer of
the benefits that come from focusing on the future. Invest-
ors are deprived of a clear and consistent framework which
they may use in question companies on the intangibles.
This is a costly regulatory blight to impose on business."8 9
Indeed, after a brief holiday pause, the uncertainty over what to
report, and how, grew as different approaches proliferated. In January,
DEFRA, the environmental agency, sent a letter to thousands of busi-
nesses reminding them of their obligation to report on significant envi-
ronmental issues in preparing the Business Review.190 Yet, months later,
fewer than ten percent of businesses knew that they had an obligation
to discuss environmental and social aspects of their business in their
Business Review.191 The Financial Times reported that the DEFRA letter
"points to a degree of confusion within government over post-OFR com-
pany reporting," even as "the Financial Reporting Council, the corporate
reporting regulator, is turning its own OFR reporting standard-now
stripped of its statutory backing-into a statement of best practice."192
Several institutional investors and corporate governance groups who
found the reporting requirements confusing wrote to DTI on January 20,
2006, asking it to act to "fill a dangerous policy vacuum created by the sud-
den abolition of a new corporate reporting rule."19 Within days, Parliament
was piling on, with "[t]he head of the Commons Treasury Committee...
rais[ing] doubts over the wisdom of scrapping mandatory OFRs" and a
House of Lords committee stating that "the House may wish to ask whether
there is adequate co-ordination within government in developing the
189 Id.
o See Fiona Harvey & Barney Jopson, Warning Over Green Reporting Rules Red Tape,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at 2.
191 See Kit Bingham, Companies Reveal Lack of Awareness, PENROSE FIN., Apr. 3, 2006.
192 Harvey & Jopson, supra note 190, at 2.
1 Barney Jopson, Action Urged to Cut Risk Caused by Abolition of Reporting Rule, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at 3. See generally Letter from Francis Ingham, Head of Public
Affairs, Chartered Institute of Public Relations, et al., to Alan Johnson, Secretary of State




underlying policy, given that the OFR requirement was introduced by
the secretary of state for trade and industry and its removal was
announced by the chancellor."'94 Then, on February 1, 2006, the potential
litigation with Friends of the Earth was settled. As part of the settlement,
the government announced that it would re-examine its decision on the
OFR requirements as part of its consultation on the Business Review.' 95
At this point, Gerald Russell, senior partner at Ernst & Young, probably
spoke for many in London when he called the situation a "farce," explain-
ing, "There was extensive consultation before the OFR was adopted-
what on earth is the point of going through it all again? It would be much
better to admit the error and reinstate the original position."96
Throughout the Spring of 2006, institutional investor activists
took the lead in trying to identify an intelligent way forward. The orig-
inal effort, reflected in the January 20 letter referred to above, was to en-
courage the government to clarify reporting responsibilities in the short
term; this encouragement did not produce a satisfactory result.'97 With
the expanded consultation, investors stepped up their efforts, first with
a thoughtful letter from Neil Dwane of Allianz Global Investors and Peter
Moon of Universities Superannuation Scheme, the chief investment offi-
cers of two large institutional investors. They called for a move beyond an
"overly ideological debate" to a recognition of the need for "rigorous re-
porting" to allow investors to "adopt a longer-term investment horizon,
take into account the factors that define corporate profitability in the
medium and longer term, [and] allocate capital more efficiently." 19 Then,
on March 23, 2006, a letter signed by twenty-seven institutional investors,
pension funds, and corporate governance activists was delivered to the
DTI.1'99 Apparently recognizing that reinstating the OFR was not likely,
... Barney Jopson, Chancellor's Abolition of Reporting Rules Fuels Discontent, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2006, at 2 (quoting Lord's Committee).
195 DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUS., NARRATIvE BUSINESS REPORTING: A CONSULTATION ON
NARRATIVE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPANIES (2006), available at http://www
.dti.gov.uk/files/file23928.pdf?pubpdfdload=06%2F886.
' Paul Grant, OFR Back on the Agenda After Government U-Turn, ACCT. AGE, Feb. 2,
2006, http://www.accountancyage.com/articles/print/2149618.
197 See Letter from Francis Ingham et al., supra note 193.
198 Neil Dwane & Peter Moon, Time to Speak up on Reporting Standards: Clarity on
Performance is Essential if Government Expectations of Long-Term Investment are to be
Realised, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at 6.
199 See generally Letter from Anne Richards, Chief Investment Officer, Aberdeen Asset
Management, et al., to Alan Johnson, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mar.
23, 2006), available at http://www.usshq.co.uk/File/pdf/others/CLR%20Letter.pdf.
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and that the debate had become polarized, the letter urged the govern-
ment to do four things: (1) use the Accounting Standards Board's Report-
ing Statement as voluntary best practice for compliance with the Busi-
ness Review; 20 (2) address directors' concerns about personal liability by
clarifying the policy on good-faith "forward looking" statements and not
penalizing directors if events turned out differently than predicted;20 1 (3)
align British developments with work being undertaken by the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board on comprehensive business report-
ing;2 and (4) assume a leadership role in "moving to an 'enlightened
shareholder value' approach which is focused on the long term."20 3 The
letter concluded that:
The type of information that companies produce, and in
what form they produce it, has a profound impact on the
way in which shareholders use that information-and a
knock-on effect on the way in which capital markets play
their role in I) the efficient allocation of capital and ii) dis-
couraging the externalization of costs on to other com-
panies, society, the environment and future generations.
Whilst the above proposals are clearly focused on the needs
of long-term responsible investors, the changes that would
result would go a long way towards meeting the legitimate
expectations of wider stakeholders. These proposals, there-
fore, represent a workable solution in the short term, and ad-
dress the Government's medium and long-term objectives. 4
The authors of the March 23 letter also articulated ten principles
for comprehensive business reporting, reproduced as Appendix A to this
Article. 2 5 These principles assumed that international convergence would
ultimately require more comprehensive business reporting and that, by
including "the totality of variables that influence corporate performance
(including extra-financial factors)," improved quality and range of the in-
formation reported would enhance both a company's decision-making and
200 Id. at 1.
201 Id. at 1-2.
202 Id. at 2.
3 Id. at2.204 id.201 See infra app. A.
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the judgments made in the capital markets. 2 6 The writers also pointed
to "extra-financial factors," such as
fundamentals that have the potential to impact companies'
financial performance or reputation in a material way, yet
are generally not part of traditional fundamental analysis.
Some examples are future political or regulatory risks, the
alignment of management and board with long-term com-
pany value, R&D/innovation, the quality of human resources
management, risks associated with governance structure,
the environment, branding, corporate ethics, and stake-
holder relations.2°7
Governments, like most people, seem loath to admit error. Thus,
the process came to a regrettable, if predictable, conclusion. On May 3,
2006, the Government announced a package of reforms that did not re-
instate the OFR requirements and seemingly took up only one of the
March 23rd letter-writers' suggestions: that of providing protection from
liability to directors for good-faith statements in their Business Review.2 °8
The Government's announcement appeared far from apologetic. Indeed,
the statements in its press release have an aggressive tone, emphasizing
that its "aim has always been to encourage meaningful strategic, forward-
looking information to assist shareholder engagement while avoiding dis-
proportionate burdens on business, in line with our better regulation
agenda."20 ' Thus, it determined that "the additional burden imposed by
the statutory OFR requirement is not justified in light of the competitive-
ness of UK businesses." 210 Then, in an unexpected twist, the Government
brought attention to what it had long ago decided to do on directors' duties:
On directors' duties, the Government amendments seek to
put beyond doubt that the need to have regard to certain
factors (including the interest of the employees and impact
on the environment) is subject to the overriding duty to
206 See Letter from Anne Richards et al., supra note 199, app. 1.
20 7 Id. app. 1 n. 1.
20 See Press Release, Dep't of Trade and Indus., New Clauses to Keep Company Law Re-
form Light Touch' (May 3,2006), available at http"/www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?Nav
igatedFromSearch=True&NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID199124; Letter from Anne Richards
et al, supra note 199, app. 1, para. 8.
209 Press Release, Dep't of Trade and Indus., supra note 208.
210 id.
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act in the way the director considers, in good faith, would
be most likely to promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members [shareholders] as a whole.21'
From a distance, it is not clear why the Government thought it
necessary to emphasize this issue in the press release. Having rejected
the pluralist, stakeholder model of the corporation early in the Company
Law Reform process, it is puzzling that the Government thought it neces-
sary to "put beyond doubt" that directors' duties are focused on the success
of the company for the benefit of shareholders.212
Still, as the Companies Bill currently stands, what has been put
beyond doubt comes surprisingly close to a stakeholder model of directors'
duties, even though the government describes it as "enlightened share-
holder value":21 3 The relevant section reads as follows:
Section 173: Duty to promote the success of the company
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he con-
siders, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters)
to-
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in
the long term,
(b) the interests of the company's employees,
(c) the need to foster the company's business
relationships with suppliers, customers[,]
and others,
(d) the impact of the company's operations on
the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining
a reputation for high standards of business
conduct, and





213 U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUS., COMPANIES BILL: PAPER SEEKING VIEWS ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE CoMPANIEs BILL TO EXISTING COMPANIES 29 (2006), available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file33125.doc.
214 Companies Bill, 2006, c. 2, §173 (U.K.)
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According to the remarks of DTI Minister for Industry and the
Regions Margaret Hodge made during Parliamentary debate, "the ele-
ments[-] (1)(a) to (f)-are crucial to any understanding of a corporate
responsibility agenda."215 When this provision was being debated in the
House of Commons on July 11, 2006, Minister Hodge emphasized the ex-
tent to which the provision on directors' duties is a departure from narrow
conceptions of shareholders' interests:
The clause does codify and bring into law for the first time
duties around corporate social responsibility. I do not run
away from that; it is a deliberate act by the Government.
That is at the heart of the Bill. For me, one of the key
issues is how we marry the commercial success of individ-
ual companies and the resulting benefits to, and growth
and prosperity of, the economy, with sustainability and
social justice. Again, for me, that is a good example of what
lies at the core of what this Labour Government [is] about:
trying to see those two issues as part of a single whole
and, despite uncomfortable tensions, trying to integrate
them as consistent principles, rather than allow them to
be competing ambitions with no commonality.2 16
The Business Review requirement articulates this statement of
duties, with its purpose being "to inform members of the company and
help them assess how the directors have performed their duty under
Section 173 (duty to promote the success of the company)."217 More spe-
cifically, the provision requires,
to the extent necessary for an understanding of the de-
velopment, performance[,] or position of the company's
business,. . . information about
(i) environmental matters (including the im-
pact of the company's business on the envi-
ronment);
(ii) the company's employees; and
(iii) social and community issues ....21
215 326 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2006) 559 (emphasis omitted).
216 Id. at 582.
217 Companies Bill § 423.
218 Id.
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If the review does not contain all of this information, it must provide an
affirmative statement of what has been omitted.219 In addition, a Review
must include, "where appropriate, analysis using other key performance
indicators, including information relating to environmental matters and
employee matters."22 ° Significantly, provisions (I) through (iii) and the "key
performance indicators" language are nearly identical to the Accounting
Standards Board proposed reporting standard for the OFR.22" '
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Even by the standards of British political melodrama, the OFR saga
has been extraordinary. The original proposal, though aggressive, evoked
reactions that ranged from enthusiasm to grudging acceptance with
surprisingly little outright hostility. On the eve of the OFR's implemen-
tation, even those corporate interests that opposed it had invested sub-
stantial resources in preparing to comply. At the last minute, however,
the Blair Government apparently had an attack of political tone-deafness,
overreacting to what was in fact muted criticism, overestimating the
opportunity to pander to business interests, and underestimating the
broad support that the requirements had engendered. In any event, the
pull-back infuriated the OFR's ideological supporters, disappointed
many in the investment community, and left the corporate community
probably more confused than relieved. It would seem that no one knows
just what happens next.
The first question is simple to state, but almost impossible to
answer: What is the law of non-financial reporting in the U.K.? As char-
acterized by a writer to the Financial Times, the OFR and the related
accounting standards "offer[ed] a clear, understandable framework for mov-
ing into this new generation of reporting."222 However, according to the ex-
pert commentary reviewed in the preceding section, the new duties impos-
ed by the Business Review seem anything but "clear" and "understandable."
219 id.
220 id.
221 Compare id., with The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and
Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 § 234ZZB(3) (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2OO5/20051011.htm.




What exactly prompted these divergent assessments is unclear.
It might be argued that the amended Companies Bill is substantively
the same as what the OFR would have imposed. Indeed, the language
of the Business Review requirement closely tracks the OFR-implement-
ing Standard promulgated by the Accounting Standards Board.224 Both
approaches call for consideration of and reporting on the environmental,
labor, and social aspects of a company's position, performance, and pros-
pects using non-financial "key performance indicators."2 5 The Business
Review provision is explicit in applying a materiality standard-the
repeated "to the extent necessary for an understanding of the develop-
ment, performance or position of the company's business"226-but the OFR
scheme also makes reference to materiality;227 in any event, the concept
is universal in accounting and auditing. Moreover, the Business Review
requires a direct acknowledgment if the directors have judged environ-
mental, labor, or social information to be immaterial.
So perhaps the infamous u-turn was in reality a 360-degree turn,
as least as judged in broad outlines. The British ship of state may now be
heading in about the same direction as it was in the OFR-driven "spring
ofhope,'1The Government certainly invited suspicion when it pulled the
OFR in'an apparent, if not transparent, effort to pander to short-term
business interests. The devious-sounding Treasury memos that quickly
surfaced did not help the Government's credibility. Prompted by the ironi-
cally progressive House of Lords, however, the U.K. in the end appears
to have taken a significant step in the direction of promoting enlightened,
long-term shareholder value as the goal of corporate management and
reporting. Our early judgment is that the Business Review procedure,
working in synergy with the best practices codes and expressions of insti-
tutional investor sentiment that came out during the OFR process, could
have essentially the same information-forcing power as the OFR. Much
of the detailed disclosure required by the Reporting Standard in imple-
menting the OFR will now be voluntary, risking loss of the inclusion of
224 Compare Companies Bill § 423, with The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial
Review and Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 § 234ZZB(3) (U.K),
available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2005/20051011.htm.
225 See Companies Bill § 423; The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review
and Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 § 234ZZB(3) (U.K.), available
at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2005/20051011.htm.
226 Companies Bill § 423.
227 See U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., MODERNIZING COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIvE
ECONOMY (2002); see also Williams & Conley, supra note 2, at 512-23.
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information about areas of a business important to investors that would
have occurred under the Reporting Standard as a mandatory standard.228
Still, investor pressures could mean that the Reporting Standard, now
recommended as best practice, becomes the norm.
The potential for "information-forcing" is worthy of emphasis. The
OFR was not, and the Companies Bill is not, a specific behavioral code.
The Companies Bill requires that directors act with "regard" for social,
labor, environmental, and ethical issues, but "in the way he considers,
in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company
for the benefit of its members as a whole."229 Significantly, the exercise
of good faith will protect against director liability. So ultimately, the pri-
mary effect of the Companies Act is, and the primary effect of the OFR
would have been, to compel an enhanced level of reporting. It will be up
to investors, especially institutional investors, to pay attention to and
make use of the information they will get, forcefully consulting with their
portfolio companies, and, in egregious cases, disinvesting. In terms of cor-
porate theory, the ultimate question is whether shareholders will accept
the invitation to become "enlightened."
This prompts two final comments about comparative law, politics,
and finance in the U.S. and the U.K. The first concerns the rationality
and openness of the entire OFR process, up to and including the u-turn.
The OFR process was one of extraordinary consultation among all inter-
ested constituencies. When each was given a voice, it turned out that a
number of them said surprising things. The process thus produced a
relative consensus that seemed surprising, even astonishing, to those of
us made cynical by the interest-group wars on this side of the Atlantic.
When the Government repudiated the results of the process, Friends of
the Earth's deft use of pre-litigation discovery exposed all of the repudia-
tion's ill-informed irrationality. If, as we cautiously predict, the Business Rev-
iew outcome proves to be the substantial equivalent of the OFR, this exposure
will have proved critical. We wonder if the same could have happened here.
Second, the whole episode reveals an aspect of British investment
culture that might put its American counterpart to shame. The U.K.'s insti-
tutional investors have repeatedly made the case that, as rational, self-
interested investors, CSR issues matter to them. These sentiments have
been seconded by these investors' accountants. With occasional exceptions
228 ASS'N OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCT., THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW: A
CATALYST FOR IROVED CORPORATE SOcIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLosuRE 4-7 (2005).
229 Companies Bill §158(1).
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usually among high visibility public funds, that clear statement of pur-
pose has been absent in this country. In our judgment, the institutions'
leadership has been essential in the U.K. Unless such leadership emerges
among American institutions, we would be surprised to see the United
States move in the direction of the OFR and Business Review at all.
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APPENDIX A
PRINCIPLES FOR BETTER REPORTING AND IMPROVED ACCOUNTABILITY
234
Underpinning our support for enhanced (or comprehensive) business
reporting is our belief that it is important to:
1. Improve company decision-making and risk management:
experience shows that the process of reporting on the dri-
vers of long-term value and risk which are most relevant
to their particular company focuses the minds of senior
management, and thus helps them actively manage these
factors and so improves their decision-making.
2. Improve investor decision making and so foster long term
value creation: by enabling investors to compare the pros-
pects and performance of companies more accurately, this
improves the financial system's focus on long-term value
creation and the allocation of capital with benefits for the en-
tire economy and those who have a diversified exposure to it.
3. Improve stakeholder communication and trust: without
compromising the accountability of companies to share-
holders, enhanced business reporting is fully aligned with
the "enlightened shareholder value" approach and goes a
long way to enabling employees, the community, regula-
tors and all stakeholders to assess better the performance
of companies on critical environmental, social and gover-
nance issues and to understand their "values in action."
4. Encourage a shift from compliance tojudgement: recognis-
ing that every company is different, there is a clear need
for an overall framework which offers companies the flexi-
bility to exercise their judgement and think less in terms
of an external standard for reporting but rather to be
aware of and focus in a practical way on the real health of
their business.
234This appendix is reprinted from Letter from Anne Richards, Chief Investment Officer,
Aberdeen Asset Management, et al., to Alan Johnson, Secretary of State for Trade and




5. Improve the quality and range of information reported on:
encouraging corporate managers to consider the totality
of variables that influence corporate performance (includ-
ing extra-financial factors) encourages greater use ofjudge-
ment by capital markets in evaluating and comparing the
prospects and performance of companies beyond traditional
financial analyses.
6. Encourage simplicity, brevity and reduce duplication of
effort: by freeing companies to convey information with
the minimum of repetition-allowing them to cross-refer
readers to other available information outside of the core
narrative-companies can create a core narrative which cap-
tures, in one place, all the key information and context that
is needed for interested parties to form an overall assess-
ment of the company.
7. Encourage smarter regulation and greater market free-
dom: by maintaining a regime that achieves the optimum
balance between minimal burden on companies and maxi-
mum market transparency and which takes into account
of company size and ownership structure.
8. Protect companies, and in particular individual directors,
against inappropriate legal risks: the risk that evolution
in the reporting framework may be used in opportunistic
derivative suits and other unwarranted litigation is real
and needs joint action.
9. Accept the right of executives to decline to disclose informa-
tion where it is in their competitive interest to do so: invest-
ors should respect this rationale and companies should not
use it as an easy excuse.
10. Prepare for international convergence: by shaping UK report-
ing regimes so that they are ready for the emerging model of
international standards and to play a leadership role in en-
couraging such convergence, so that any short-term threat
of competitive disadvantage to "U-K plc" is quickly removed
and indeed converted into a first-mover advantage.
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